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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Rules 3 and 4, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Under Utah's burglary statute, can an individual who 
has both a lease of real property and the sublessor's invitation 
to enter the property commit an unlawful entry or remaining when 
neither the lease nor the invitation is revoked? This issue was 
preserved at Tr. Vol. 2, at 54-60 (Motion for Directed Verdict); 
R. at 172-73 (Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment); R. at 223-
24 (Rule 24 Motion for New Trial). 
B. Is evidence that one entered a property in the same 
manner he had lawfully done dozens of previous times sufficient 
to show the person had the specific intent to unlawfully enter or 
remain and commit a crime within the premises? This issue was 
preserved at Tr. Vol. 2, at 54-60 (Motion for Directed Verdict); 
R. at 172-73 (Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment); R. at 223-
24 (Rule 24 Motion for New Trial). 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In a criminal case, the State must produce evidence to 
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant committed the 
crime charged. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1). If the State fails 
1 
to produce sufficient evidence as to any one or more of the 
necessary elements of the charged offense, the Court must reverse 
a jury's verdict of guilt. State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 
(Utah App. 1990). Furthermore, legal questions, such as the 
meaning of "licensed" or "privileged" under the burglary statute, 
or whether the fact of commission of a crime is sufficient to 
infer "intent" under the burglary statute, are reviewed for 
correctness. Corbett v. Seamans. 904 P.2d 229, 1232 (Utah App. 
1995). Similarly, whether the plaintiff has established a prima 
facie case is also reviewed for correctness. 
In reviewing the evidence presented at trial the Court 
must view all facts, as well as all reasonable inferences derived 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991). In such a case, 
the role of the reviewing court is to neither judge the credi-
bility of witnesses nor review the case as finders of fact. 
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Rather, review 
is limited to the question of whether there is sufficient evi-
dence, including all reasonable inferences, from which each 
element of the offense can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). "[0]nly when 
the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable 
2 
person could not have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt" will a jury's verdict be overturned. State v. Isaacson, 
704 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1985). 
VI. CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (definitions). 
For the purposes of this part: 
* * • 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" 
in or upon premises when the premises or any 
portion thereof at the time of the entry or 
remaining are not open to the public and when the 
actor is not licensed or privileged to enter or 
remain on the premises or such portions thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 Burglary 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
person. 
*** 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
*** 
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VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below. 
Defendant seeks review of the Trial Court's denial of 
Defendant's motions for Directed Verdict, to Arrest Judgment, and 
for a New Trial. R. at 284-292. Mr. Hawkins was convicted on or 
about June 26, 1996 of burglary, a third-degree felony, and 
theft, a Class A misdemeanor. Mr. Hawkins, through his prior 
cousnel, made timely Motions for Directed Verdict and to Arrest 
Judgment and through current counsel moved for New Trial. Tr., 
Vol. 2 at 54-60; R. at 172-73, 223-24. The trial court denied 
these motions. R. at 284-92. Mr. Hawkins filed a timely Notice 
of Appeal. R. at 293. 
B. Statement of Facts• 
The State charged that on or about January 13, 1996, 
Mr. Hawkins committed a burglary of a garage/storage unit located 
at 4195 South 500 West, #99 ("unit 99"), Salt Lake City, Utah. 
R. at 120 (Amended Information). Unit 99 is located in a light 
industrial complex containing 100 similar units. Tr., Vol. 1, at 
194-95. Gordon Construction owned the complex and rented the 
units to individuals for use as mechanics shops, automobile 
painting booths and storage areas. Tr., Vol. 1, at 64, 195. 
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Gloria Markham leased adjoining units 98 and 99 from 
Gordon Construction. Tr., Vol. 1, at 64. Units 98 and 99 were 
connected by an interior door which had no lock. Tr., Vol. 1, at 
148. Gloria Markham leased those units in partnership with her 
brother Tim Markham. Tr., Vol. 1, at 68, 85. Even though Gloria 
Markham was the actual lessee of units 98 and 99, Tim Markham was 
the one who worked in the units and paid the rent to Gordon 
Construction. Tr., Vol. 1, at 68, 85, 88-89. 
Gloria Markham regularly allowed Tim Markham to sublet or 
permit others to use units 98 and 99. Tr., Vol. 1, at 70, 135-
36. The general arrangement Tim Markham had with people he 
allowed to use the units was, "you pay you stay. If you don't, 
you go." Tr., Vol. 1, at 136, 145. 
During the summer of 1995, Tim Markham entered into a 
sublease agreement for unit 98 with Mr. Hawkins. Tr., Vol. 1, at 
136, 138, 140, 67, 71. Mr. Hawkins rented the space in order to 
perform auto-body work and painting. Tr., Vol. 1, at 136-38. 
Tim Markham had the same arrangement with Mr. Hawkins he had with 
others he permitted to use and enter the units -- "you pay, you 
stay. If you don't you go."1 Tr., Vol. 1, at 136, 169. As 
initially, Mr. Hawkins paid Mr. Markham on a per-car basis. 
Tr., Vol. 1, at 136-3 8. That agreement was later modified to a 
month-to-month arrangement. Tr., Vol. 1, at 169. 
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rent, Mr. Hawkins paid Mr. Markham one-half of what Mr. Markham 
paid to lease both units. Tr., Vol. 1, at 169. The combined 
rent for both shops was $680. Id. Thus, Mr. Markham required 
Mr. Hawkins to pay a monthly rent of $340.00. Tr., Vol. 1, at 
169. Mr. Hawkins usually paid his half of the rent on the units 
directly to Mark Gordon. Tr., Vol. 1, at 170. 
Although Mr. Hawkins rented the spaces so he could 
perform auto-body repair and painting, he lacked the necessary 
tools for that type of work. Tim Markham testified that tools 
such as impact wrenches, pulleys, welders, grinders and spray 
guns were essential to auto-body repair work. Tr., Vol. 1, at 
152 (referring to State's Exhibit 3). When Mr. Hawkins began 
working in the units, the only tools he brought were a sander and 
an air file, which he borrowed from a third person. Tr., Vol. 1, 
at 136. Thereafter, the only additional tools Mr. Hawkins 
acquired were a couple of metal boxes containing sockets, 
ratchets and screwdrivers, and an air blower. Tr., Vol. 1, at 
172; State's Exhibit 4. Therefore, Tim Markham allowed Mr. 
Hawkins to use Mr. Markham's tools so Mr. Hawkins could perform 
auto body work. Tr., Vol. 1, at 159, 171. Tim Markham kept most 
of his tools in Unit 99. Tr., Vol. 1, at 117, 150. Accordingly, 
Mr. Hawkins frequently worked and was seen working in both units 
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98 and 99. Tr., Vol. 2, at 10, 33. Indeed, Jim Severns, another 
tenant in the complex, understood Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Markham 
were sharing units 98 and 99. Tr., Vol. 2, at 34. 
In addition to the few tools Mr. Hawkins had, he kept 
several of his personal items in unit 99 including a microwave 
oven, dragster brakes, curio cabinet glass doors and a dragster. 
Tr., Vol. 1, at 140, 157, 172-73; Tr., Vol. 2, at 99. 
Mr. Hawkins frequently worked in the units when Mr. 
Markham was not there. Tr., Vol. 1, at 13 8. Mr. Hawkins did not 
keep a regular schedule of when he worked or would work in the 
units. Tr., Vol. 1, at 138. Tim Markham testified he knew of at 
least four times when Mr. Hawkins worked in the shop during the 
middle of the night and, on occasion, would work there through 
the night. Tr., Vol. 1, at 138. Jim Severns also testified that 
it was not unusual to see Mr. Hawkins work in units 98 and 99 all 
night long. Tr., Vol. 2, at 34. There is nothing in the record 
showing Mr. Markham objected to this practice. 
Each unit in the complex has two access points: a side 
door and a roll-up garage door. Tr., Vol. 1, at 101, 195. The 
Markhams had given Mr. Hawkins a key to the side door. Tim 
Markham testified that on the occasions Mr. Hawkins did not have 
his key with him, he accessed the units by rolling under the 
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roll-up garage door of the unit. Tr., Vol. 1, at 13 8. The 
garage door of unit 98 was missing a couple of rollers and, 
therefore, could not be locked as designed. Tr., Vol. 1, at 101, 
147. In order to secure the door one would have to "take vice 
grips to clamp the door shut so you couldn't raise it up." Tr., 
Vol. 1, at 14 7-48. Mr. Hawkins told Mr. Markham he knew how to, 
and in fact would, circumvent the vice-grip lock in order to 
access the units when he forgot his key to the unit. Tr., Vol. 
1, at 13 8. Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Markham 
objected to this method of access by Mr. Hawkins. And, nothing 
in the record establishes that prior to January 13, 1996, 
Mr. Markham sought from Mr. Hawkins return of the key. 
Mr. Hawkins was current with the rent through November 
1995.2 Tim Markham testified that in October Mr. Hawkins paid 
him $290.00 for rent. Tr., Vol. 1, at 190. This amount repre-
sented the amount of rent Mr. Hawkins owed to date. Tr., Vol. 1, 
at 189. Mark Gordon later testified that Mr. Hawkins paid rent 
for the month of November 1995. Tr., Vol. 1, at 213-14; 
Defendant's Exhibit 14. 
2
 During cross-examination, Mr. Markham conceded that if 
Mr. Hawkins was in fact current with the rent through November, 
uhe should have come down . . . ." Tr., Vol. 1, at 171. 
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Although Mr. Hawkins' rent was current through November 
1995, he seemed to "disappear" near the end of October 1995. 
Tr., Vol. 1, at 108, 13 9; Tr., Vol. 2, at 10. The record shows, 
however, he did not remove any of his belongings from units 98 
and 99. Tr., Vol. 1, at 108; Tr., Vol. 2, at 17; State's Exhibit 
4. 
There is nothing in the record indicating that after 
October 1995 the Markhams ever told Mr. Hawkins not to come to 
the units or told Mr. Hawkins he was no longer welcome. 
Moreover, on cross-examination, both Gloria Markham and Tim 
Markham conceded they never evicted Mr. Hawkins from the units. 
Tr., Vol. 1, at 113, 170. 
While the State's evidence lacks any mention that the 
Markhams told Mr. Hawkins he was no longer welcome in the units, 
it is replete with evidence that after October 1995, Gloria 
Markham, Tim Markham and Jim Severns repeatedly urged and invited 
Mr. Hawkins to come to the units. Tr., Vol. 1, at 108-09, 141-
42; Tr., Vol. 2, at 19-20. Gloria Markham testified that Jim 
Severns, Tim and Lisa "all the time" would call the business 
where John worked to ask John to retrieve his property. Tr., 
Vol. 1, at 108-09. Tim Markham testified, xx [John] was called 
three or four or ten or twenty times, and we told him to move the 
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car . . . we told him to come get his dragster." Tr., Vol. 1, at 
141. Tim Markham personally told Mr. Hawkins to u[c]ome get your 
stuff." Tr., Vol. 1, at 142. Jim Severns spoke with John three 
or four times and told John the landlord and Mr. Markham wanted 
Mr. Hawkins to come to the units to remove his belongings. Tr., 
Vol. 2, at 19-20. 
Unit 99 was allegedly burgled at approximately 4:00 a.m. 
on January 13, 1996. At that time Jim Severns was in his unit 
and heard two cars running in the complex. Tr., Vol 2, at 11, 
14-15. Concerned with a rash of thefts that had occurred in the 
area, Mr. Severns investigated,. Tr., Vol. 2, at 11. When Mr. 
Severns walked outside he saw "two cars parked there, and the 
drivers were talking to each other." Tr., Vol. 2, at 11. At 
that point one car headed west and the other pulled up in front 
of Mr. Severns' unit. Tr., Vol. 2, at 11. The latter car was 
driven by Mr. Hawkins. Tr., Vol. 2, at 11. Mr. Hawkins asked 
Mr. Severns what he was doing there, and Mr. Severns asked the 
same of Mr. Hawkins. Tr., Vol. 2, at 11. During that con-
versation Mr. Hawkins "seemed nervous." Tr., Vol. 2, at 52. 
When asked what he was doing there, Mr. Hawkins stated he was 
looking for his dog. Tr., Vol. 2, at 12. Shortly thereafter, 
Mr. Hawkins' dalmatian ran around the corner and jumped into the 
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car Mr. Hawkins was driving. Tr., Vol. 2, at 12. Mr. Hawkins 
then drove off. Tr., Vol. 2, at 12. 
Mr. Severns spoke with Mr. Hawkins two other times that 
morning. The next conversation occurred at approximately 4:12 
a.m. Tr., Vol. 2, at 13-14. During that conversation 
Mr. Hawkins told Mr. Severns he had driven by the shop and had 
seen that the door was open. Tr., Vol. 2, at 14. Mr. Hawkins 
called back a few minutes later and asked Mr. Severns to get all 
of Mr. Hawkins' belongings out of the units for him. Tr., Vol. 
2, at 14. After the second call Mr. Severns went back to sleep. 
Tr., Vol. 2, at 15. 
Mr. Severns woke up around 6:30 a.m. Tr., Vol. 2, at 15. 
Mr. Severns then left his unit and walked to the other end of the 
yard as he usually did each morning. Tr., Vol. 2, at 15. When 
Mr. Severns walked by unit 98 he noticed the bottom of the roll-
up garage door had been kicked in. Tr., Vol. 2, at 15. 
Mr. Severns contacted Gloria and Tim Markham concerning what had 
occurred. Tr., Vol. 2, at 16. Gloria Markham, Tim Markham and 
Jim Severns inspected the units and discovered several items were 
missing including items belonging to Mr. Hawkins and items belong 
to Mr. Markham. Tr., Vol. 2, at 16; State's Exhibits, 3 & 4. 
They also noticed puppy footprints on the furniture. Tr., Vol. 
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1, at 126; Tr., Vol. 2, at 18. None of the missing items has 
been recovered. 
Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury found Mr. 
Hawkins guilty of burglary. R. at 168. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A. The State Failed to Offer Sufficient Evidence to 
Prove an Unlawful Entry or Remaining. 
Mr. Hawkins could not have committed an unlawful entry 
because he had the express permission of the leaseholders to 
enter and remain on the property. Prior to the alleged burglary, 
the Markhams gave Mr. Hawkins two express grants of authority to 
enter the units. First, in the summer of 1995, the Markhams 
entered into a lease agreement with Mr. Hawkins in connection 
with the use of the units and knew Mr. Hawkins regularly entered 
both units. The lease agreement, "license" and "privilege" were 
never revoked and Mr. Hawkins was never evicted. Second, begin-
ning in November 1995, the Markhams repeatedly urged and invited 
Mr. Hawkins to return to the units to remove his belongings. 
These two specific grants of authority by the Markhams 
vested in Mr. Hawkins the lawful right, or license, to enter and 
remain in the units. Accordingly, no unlawful entry or remaining 
could have occurred. 
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B. The State Failed to Offer Sufficient Evidence to 
Show Mr. Hawkins Entered or Remained in Unit 99 with 
the Specific Intent to Commit a Felony, Theft or 
Assault on Any Person. 
At trial, the State failed to offer any evidence to show 
Mr. Hawkins possessed a specific criminal intent to commit a 
theft when he entered or remained in unit 99. The State offered 
no evidence to show Mr. Hawkins entered unit 99 with any purpose 
in mind other than to remove his belongings. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
In order to support a burglary conviction, the State must 
establish two elements. State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1981); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981). The State must 
show first that the accused entered or remained unlawfully, and 
second, that the accused did so with the intent to commit a 
theft. Id. In this case, the State failed to introduce suffi-
cient evidence to establish either prong. 
A. Mr. Hawkins Did Not Commit an Unlawful Entry Because 
He Entered the Property in Question with the 
Permission of the Property Possessors. 
Utah's burglary statute specifically requires that the 
State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused committed an 
unlawful entry or remaining. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1). In 
order to show an unlawful entry or remaining, the State must 
prove the accused entered or remained on the premises without 
13 
license or privilege. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3). If the 
State fails to make that showing or, as in this case, offers in 
its case-in-chief unrefuted evidence showing the accused entered 
or remained on the property with the permission of the property 
holder, the burglary conviction must be vacated. See State v. 
Harper, 785 P.2d 1341 (Kan. 1990) (interpreting a similar 
statute). Thus, a burglary conviction cannot stand where the 
undisputed evidence shows the accused received the express and 
unrestricted permission to enter the property in question and 
that permission was not thereafter revoked. 
1. Unlawful Entry Requires an Entry That Is Made 
Without the Authority of the Property Holder. 
The first element of the crime of burglary may be estab-
lished by showing the accused committed an unlawful entry. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1). However, this element was not designed 
to make criminals out of those who enter with the alleged 
victim's permission. Historically, "the law was not ready to 
punish one who had been invited in any way to enter the dwelling. 
The law sought only to keep out intruders, thus anyone given 
authority to come into the house could not be committing a 
breaking when he so entered." W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook 
on Criminal Law § 96, p. 708. 
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Modern burglary statutes, such as Utah's, which require 
an unlawful entry, are generally interpreted as retaining this 
aspect of the common law. State v. Thibeault. 402 A.2d 445 
(1979) . In Thibeault. the Maine Supreme Court explained: 
In other jurisdictions, . . . the word "breaking" has 
been eliminated and a word or phrase such as 
"unlawful," "unauthorized" or "without license or 
privilege" has been inserted in the statute to qualify 
"entry." Where such language has been employed in a 
burglary statute, the result has generally been to 
retain so much of the breaking elements as required a 
trespassory entry while at the same time eliminating 
the illogical rules stemming from the "force" aspect of 
breaking. Of course, where the stature requires a 
trespassory entry, the lawful possessor's consent is a 
complete defense. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
Utah has retained the common law element that a trespass 
is necessary to satisfy the first element of the offense. As 
such, and in addition to the plain language of the statute, 
consent of the possessor remains a complete defense. 
State v. Harper, 785 P.2d 1341 (Kan. 1990) was decided 
under very similar facts and interprets a nearly identical 
statute. There, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed a burglary 
conviction where the defendant had permission to enter the 
building at issue. Id. at 1349. The alleged victim in Harper. 
"Dukes," owned a softball complex. Id. at 1342. Dukes hired 
Harper to construct a garage on the complex. Thereafter, Dukes 
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hired Harper as head groundskeeper for the complex for the 1986 
season. Dukes gave Harper a key to the complex so Harper could 
carry out his duties as groundskeeper. Dukes did not restrict 
Harper's access to the complex and, in fact, gave Harper 
permission to stay in the building overnight "to take care of 
business or if he was too intoxicated to drive." Id. 
When the garage was not completed by the end of the 1986 
season, Dukes asked Harper to return the keys. Harper told Dukes 
he needed the keys to retrieve his belongings. Dukes did not 
press the issue and let Harper keep the keys. At no time there-
after did Dukes tell Harper he could not enter the building or 
stay overnight. Furthermore, there was no indication Harper 
continued to work for Dukes after Dukes requested return of the 
keys. Id. 
In April 1987, at approximately 2:00 a.m., presumably 
some four or five months after the end of the softball season, 
Harper entered the complex using the key Dukes had provided him. 
Once inside, Harper broke into a filing cabinet and removed files 
belonging to Dukes. Id. at 1343. Defendant was subsequently 
charged and convicted of burglary. Id. 
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The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding 
that the State failed to satisfy the element of unlawful entry. 
The Court reasoned: 
Dukes' testimony established that he gave defendant a 
key and allowed him, in essence, full access to the 
building at all hours, including the authority to stay 
overnight. Although Dukes apparently asked for the 
keys back, he did not receive them and was aware that 
defendant still retained the keys. Furthermore, Dukes 
did not restrict defendant's ability to have access to 
the building by placing any specific limitation upon 
the access given through the possession of a key. The 
State's suggestion, by its leading question, and the 
finding by the Court of Appeals that defendant did not 
have permission to be in the building at 2:00 a.m. was 
[sic] contradicted in the answer given by Dukes.3 
Defendant did have authority to be in the building at 
2:00 a.m. 
Id. at 1345. 
If a burglary statute requires an unlawful entry which is 
defined as an entry made without license or privilege, an unlaw-
ful entry cannot occur where the accused was given permission to 
3uxQ [by prosecutor]: Well, did he have permission to be in 
there at two in the morning? 
A [by Dukes]: That particular night, no. 
Q: Had he before that? 
A: I do recall making the statement the year before that if 
he needed to get in and take care of business or, you know 
he got - he got where he couldn't drive home because he was 
intoxicated or something, that he could stay on my couch. I 
will admit that. But he didn't have my permission to be 
there; at that time . . . .'" 
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enter unless and until that permission is withdrawn prior to 
entry. People v. Barefield, 804 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Colo. App. 
1990) (citing People v. Carstensen. 420 P.2d 820 (Colo. 1966)). 
2. Mr. Hawkins Could Not Have Committed an 
Unlawful Entry Because He Entered the Property 
with the Permission of the Leaseholders. 
The State's case in chief clearly demonstrated that 
Mr. Hawkins entered unit 99 with the Markhams' permission, 
license and privilege. Indeed, the Markhams gave Mr. Hawkins two 
express grants of authority to enter, either of which was suffi-
cient to allow him to enter the unit lawfully. The first grant 
of authority was the un-revoked lease agreement the Markhams 
entered into with Mr. Hawkins. The second grant of authority 
came by means of the repeated invitations the Markhams extended 
Mr. Hawkins to remove his belongings from both units 98 and 99. 
a. The lease agreement Mr. Hawkins had with the 
Markhams vested in him the lawful right to 
enter unit 99 and Mr. Markham Ratified Mr. 
Hawkins' Open and Notorious Entry of Unit 99. 
Mr. Hawkins did not commit an unlawful entry because he 
had a valid lease agreement that was never terminated. In the 
summer of 1995, Mr. Hawkins entered into a lease with the 
Markhams. Tr., Vol. 1, at 13 6, 13 8, 14 0, 67, 71. Mr. Markham 
testified that the initial lease was for unit 98. Tr., Vol. 1, 
at 169. However, the record reveals one of two necessary 
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conclusions. First, the scope of the lease extended to both 
units 98 and 99. According to Mr. Markham, the monthly rent was 
calculated at one-half the monthly rental for both units. Id. 
Units 98 and 99 were connected by an interior door which had no 
lock. Tr., Vol. 1, at 148. It was known anyone with access to 
unit 98 had access to unit 99. Furthermore, Mr. Markham gave Mr. 
Hawkins permission to use tools which were located in unit 99 and 
thus license to enter unit 99. Tr., Vol. 1, at 159, 171. Mr. 
Hawkins also kept his belongings there and his work in both units 
was open and notorious. Tr., Vol. 1, at 140, 157, 172-73; Tr., 
Vol. 2, at 10, 33. Finally, according to Mr. Severns, it 
appeared as if Mr. Hawkins was leasing both units. Tr., Vol. 2, 
at 34. 
Second, regardless of whether the initial lease agreement 
went to both units, or whether the conduct of the parties modi-
fied the lease agreement to reach both units, the record is clear 
that Mr. Hawkins had full, unrestricted access to both units 98 
and 99. Mr. Markham invited Mr. Hawkins' entry into unit 99 by 
offering the use of his tools, and ratified Mr. Hawkins' entry 
into unit 99 by never objecting to Mr. Hawkins' repeated, open 
and notorious entries into the unit. Thus, whether the lease 
extended to both units or Mr. Hawkins was merely licensed to 
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enter unit 99, the record establishes Mr. Hawkins had both the 
license and privilege to enter unit 99 without restriction. 
Mr. Hawkins' right to access unit 99 was never terminated 
or revoked. Both Markhams conceded on cross-examination that 
they never evicted Mr. Hawkins from either unit. Tr., Vol. 1, at 
113, 170. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate either Tim or Gloria Markham ever told Mr. Hawkins he 
was no longer welcome. Indeed, there is no evidence even to this 
day the Markhams have sought the return of the key they provided 
Mr. Hawkins to access the units. 
These facts were materially identical to the facts in 
Harper. In both cases, the alleged victim testified he gave the 
accused, in essence, full access to the building at all hours, 
including the authority to stay overnight. Neither victim 
restricted defendant's ability to enter the building by placing 
any specific limitations on access. The only evidence suggesting 
the accused lacked authority to enter the property on the night 
in question was an improper question concerning whether the 
alleged victim gave the accused permission to enter on the night 
in question which was contradicted by the victim's own 
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testimony;4 questions which, in effect, elicited legal 
conclusions. 
Mr. Markham's legal conclusion and his unexpressed 
feeling that he did not want Mr. Hawkins to enter were irrelevant 
and inconsistent with his own testimony. First, after Mr. 
Markham testified he entered into a lease with Mr. Hawkins, the 
State had the burden to show the lease was terminated or Mr. 
Hawkins was evicted. There was no such showing. 
Second, Mr. Markham's claim that Mr. Hawkins did not have 
his permission to be in the units on the night in question does 
not follow. Mr. Markham leased the units to Mr. Hawkins and 
repeatedly ratified Mr. Hawkins' entry into unit 99. In addi-
tion, on numerous occasions Mr. Markham invited, and in fact 
urged, Mr. Hawkins to return to the units to remove his belong-
ings. Neither of those two grants of authority was ever 
rescinded. Indeed, the state objected when Mr. Hawkins, while 
testifying, produced the key to access the units. Tr., Vol. 2, 
at 169. 
4xxQ. (Prosecutor) xDid [Mr. Hawkins] have your permission 
to be in either unit 99 or 98 on January the 13th? 
A. (Mr. Markham) No, absolutely not.'" Tr., Vol. 1, at 149. 
See supra, footnote 3, which quotes the similar exchange in 
Harper. 
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The law does not permit a property possessor to invite 
another to enter his property, and then, months after the fact, 
claim to revoke that permission when he does not like the result. 
If Mr, Markham did not want Mr. Hawkins to return to the units, 
he was required to make that known. He did not do so. 
The Markhams granted Mr. Hawkins the license and 
privilege to enter both units 98 and 99. They never revoked that 
license by terminating the lease, evicting Mr. Hawkins or 
informing him he was no longer welcome. Therefore, as a matter 
of law, Mr. Hawkins could not have committed an unlawful entry. 
b. The Markhams granted Mr. Hawkins license and 
privilege to enter unit 99 when they repeatedly 
asked Mr. Hawkins to return to remove his 
belongings. 
In addition to the license granted Mr. Hawkins via the 
lease agreement and Mr. Markham7s invitation and ratification of 
Mr. Hawkins' open and notorious entry into unit 99, the Markhams' 
repeated invitations that he return to the units to remove his 
belongings also vested in Mr. Hawkins a lawful right to enter 
unit 99. Mr. Hawkins left a number of personal possessions in 
the units. Tr., Vol. 1, at 108, 139; Tra, Vol.2, at 17; State's 
Exhibit 4.5 According to the Markhams, they wanted those items 
5Indeed, the Markhams testified they charged him for storing 
his property in the Units [Defendant's Ex. 6], which evinces an 
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removed. Gloria Markham testified that Jim Severns, Tim and Lisa 
had called Mr. Hawkins' work "all the time" and told him to come 
get his property. Tr., Vol. 1, at 108-09. Tim Markham testified 
that he and others called Mr. Hawkins as many as twenty times and 
told him to remove his belongings. Tr., Vol. 1, at 141. 
Finally, Jim Severns testified he personally told Mr. Hawkins 
that Mr. Gordon and Mr. Markham wanted Mr. Hawkins to come back 
to the units to pick up his property. Tr., Vol. 2, at 19-20. 
Pursuant to the Markhams' repeated requests, Mr. Hawkins 
returned to the units and removed his belongings. Even if 
Mr. Hawkins took property from unit 99 that did not belong to 
him, he would be a thief, but not a burglar. Jackson v. State, 
259 So.2d 739, 744 (Fla. App. 1972) (Justice McNulty, 
concurring). 
The Markhams entered into a lease agreement with Mr. 
Hawkins granting him complete and unrestricted access to units 98 
and 99. That lease was never terminated either by act or 
implication. Thereafter, the Markhams extended an open 
invitation to Mr. Hawkins to return to the units to remove his 
additional indicia of his license and privilege to enter. If two 
people are sharing a storage unit and each has a key, they each 
have license to enter. The removal by one person of more 
property than he owns does not make him a burglar. 
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belongings. The Markhams placed no restrictions on Mr. Hawkins 
concerning when he could return to the units or whether someone 
else must be present when he did so. These two express grants of 
authority vested in Mr. Hawkins both the license and privilege to 
enter unit 99. Therefore, Mr. Hawkins could not have committed 
an unlawful entry. 
B. Mr. Hawkins Did Not Commit an Unlawful Remaining 
Because His Permission to Enter the Premises Was Not 
Revoked. 
Mr. Hawkins entered unit 99 pursuant to two specific 
grants of authority from the Markhams. See Argument, (A), supra. 
That permission was never revoked. Therefore, Mr. Hawkins could 
not have committed an unlawful remaining. 
1. Unlawful Remaining Requires a Presence in or on 
a Property Which Continues After Authority to 
Enter Is Revoked. 
If there is no unlawful entry, the State must show an 
unlawful remaining in order to sustain a burglary charge. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3). Unlawful remaining applies "where the 
defendant's initial entry is authorized, but at some later time 
that person's presence becomes unauthorized." State v. Bradley, 
752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Brown, 630 P.2d 
731 (Kan. 1981)) . Thus, in order for an unlawful remaining to 
occur, the initial authority to enter must be revoked. 
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may be made by implication or affirmative act. Speaking : the 
former, the Court in Brown noted, "one who ei iter s a , I = p< * L\ • n : u 
store during business hours and secretes himself or herself in a 
public washroom until the store is closed, remains without 
ai i t l I :: i : :i try . . . " Kansas 
Crim. C. § 21-3715 (1 971)) Interpreting a similar statute and 
citing the same hypothetical, the Alabama Supreme Court reci^on-eu 
< ' \-wful remaining occurs in such a case because, "such a 
person remains knowing that his license or privilege to 
. •:
j
-;i'-j . :. C A , - t n - s hlx. Parte Gentry 
v. State, 689 So,2d 916, 919 (Ala, 1996). Thus, by implication, 
license to remain in a building terminates once the building 
rl nses tc: tl ie public . 
A license or privilege to remain in or on a property may 
jibe :.'- ' ^ pititofa- ; . i''''i i y unp.lt
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who is present tells the accused to leave the property or that he 
is no longer welcome, the accused's license or privilege to 
remain therein expires, provided the accused is not otherwise 
entitled to be there, such as by lease. 
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was intended is an insufficient basis for finding that the entry 
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or remaining was without license or privilege." People v. 
Hutchinson. 124 Misc. 2d 487, 490, 477 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (Sup. Ct 
1984), aff'd, 121 A.2d 849, 503 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986), appeal 
dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d 770, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1054, 498 N.E.2d 156 
(1986); People v. Crowell. 470 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1983). The 
Hutchinson court explained that finding that the commission of a 
crime constitutes an unlawful remaining would "impermissibly 
[broaden] the scope of liability for burglary, making a burglary 
of anyone who commits a crime on someone else's premises." Id. 
Indeed, as the drafters of the Model Penal Code noted, taken to 
its extreme, such an interpretation would lead to the even more 
absurd result of making a burglar out of one who entered his own 
home to prepare a fraudulent tax return or assault his wife. 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries. Part II § 221.1, p. 64-65 
(1980) . 
Similar reasoning was used in People v. Crowell. 470 
N.Y.S.2d 306 (1983), where the court granted Crowell's motion to 
dismiss a burglary indictment because he had been granted 
permission to enter the victim's home and that permission was 
never revoked. Id. at 307-08. There, the alleged victim hired 
Crowell to paint his home. Id. at 307. The homeowner gave 
Crowell a key to the home and allowed him access to store 
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inside, Crowell stole some of the homeowner's property Id. at 
3 08 . Crowell was indicted for burglar \ Til: :i B :: :: i 1:1 : t • ::1 :i si t: t.:i ssed tl i $ 
indictment, reasoning as follows: 
In this case, the defendant clearly was licensed or 
privileged to be in the victim's building. Neither the 
victim here nor any owner would ever intend that his 
permission to enter or remain would extend to accom-
modate a thief. However, the privilege to be within. 
the premises is not negated by the formulation of 
criminal intent, or even the undertaking of criminal 
actions therein. . . . Upon reflection, it will be 
seen that not terminating one's license or privilege 
upon his commission of criminal conduct makes both 
practical and theoretical sense. A r i 1] e to the 
contrary would mean that an intoxicated guest who loses 
his temper and intentionally smashes a vase becomes a 
burglar. Innumerable like examples can be imagined. 
Such was not the intent of the legislature in creating 
the burglary statute, all of which have trespassorial 
conduct as one essential element. Clearly, to consti-
tute a burglary, this conduct must exist separately 
from and independently of the criminal intent. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
Thus , :i f t l le accused ei rt:e:i : s til: le prop ei : ty i u: 1 i e r tl le 
authority of license or privilege, the possessor must revoke that 
authority before an unlawful remaining can occur "I J'ithout the 
necessary revocation, a burqlary cannot occur regardless of what 
the license holder's intent may be. 
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2. Mr. Hawkins Did Not Commit an Unlawful 
Remaining Because His Permission to Enter the 
Property Was Never Revoked. 
The State failed to offer any evidence that Mr. Hawkins' 
lawful right to remain in unit 99 was ever revoked. As such, an 
unlawful remaining did not occur. Once the State demonstrated 
Mr. Hawkins had a lawful right to enter unit 99, it had the 
burden to show Mr. Hawkins' presence became unauthorized. State 
v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). Here, there was no 
such showing. Accordingly, the State failed to satisfy the 
essential element of an unlawful remaining. 
Nothing in the record shows Mr. Hawkins' license or 
privilege to enter unit 99 was either implicitly or expressly 
revoked. First, Mr. Hawkins' license to remain was not 
implicitly revoked. An implicit revocation occurs, for example, 
when the actor enters a property and thereafter hides in or on 
the property knowing his authority to remain will terminate at 
some point. Such was not the case here. Mr. Hawkins returned to 
the units in the early morning hours as had been his practice. 
Accordingly, there was no implicit revocation. 
Seqond, Mr. Hawkins' authority to remain was not 
explicitly revoked. Explicit revocation occurs when the property 
possessor expressly communicates to the actor that he is no 
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property possessors, Gloria and Tim Markham, were not present 
v/hen I li: I l awki i is cor i tp] 1 eci ; i :i t l i t l :i E :ii :i : ::> : i itj i n i : i is i: eqi lests tl lat 1 :i E 
remove his belongings. Accordingly, the Markhams did not, and 
indeed could not, expressly revoke Mr. Hawkins' license to remain 
: 9. 
The testimony of the so-called victims in t;.:s case 
established that they expressly and repeatedly vestea *r. 
Hawkins the lawful right to enter both units 98 and 99. '.n*w 
never thereafter revoked that license or privilege. Therefore, 
as a n: Latte: : :: f 1 a ; i 
unlawful remaining. 
£^ ^
 T^ e state Failed to offer burr . nivi. 10 
Show Mr. Hawkins Possessed the r•=*" 
Necessary to Support a Burglary L 
In addition to establishing an unlawful entry or 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202,':
 ; . A:: i-ct is committed with intent when it 
is the actor's conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or c ause the result. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1) . ; 
Evidence of burglarious intent is rarely, if ever, 
susce* • State 'v I orter, ; 05 I 2- i III 1 7 1 , 
1177 (Utah 198'-. It is usually inferred from circumstantial 
evidence: the manner of entry, the time of day, the character and 
contents of the building, the person's actions after the entry, 
the totality of the circumstances, and the intruder's explana-
tion." Id. In light of these criteria, the act of entry, alone, 
is insufficient to prove intent. State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 
1071, 1072-72 (Utah 1989) . 
The majority of the modern Utah Supreme Court cases 
addressing the element of criminal intent under the burglary 
statute have two common themes. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 
(Utah 1985); State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986); State v. Isaacson. 704 P.2d 
555 (Utah 1985); State v. Wilson. 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981); State v. Brooks. 631 
P.2d 878 (Utah 1981). First, the initial entry was unauthorized, 
and second, the entry occurred under unusual or suspicious cir-
cumstances. In Brooks. for example, Brooks pried off a screen at 
approximately 11:00 p.m. in order to gain access to a stranger's 
apartment. Brooks stayed in the apartment for approximately 15 
minutes. While inside, he turned off three or four switches on a 
power panel. In Johnson, the defendant entered a stranger's 
locked apartment. Once inside Johnson partially shut the door, 
wandered around the apartment and opened a jewelry box owned by 
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sufficient evidence to support the inference of criminal intent. 
The totality of the circumstances here reveals a lack of 
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Mr. Hawkins. Reasonable minds could not infer a criminal intent 
based upon the marine] : • :: f e n t r y , the tirne of iay , the character 
and contents of the building, Mr. Hawkins' actions after entry, 
or his explanation of why he was at the unit on the night in 
cmest H * - - ~ •' t * -  " :•-'• 
evinces an occurrence which was expected and commonplace with 
respect to the parties. 
First, there was nothing suspicious or unusual concerning 
the manner in which Mr. Hawkins entered the units, Mi : Hawkins 
roll-up garage door. Mr. Markham testified he knew Mi Hawkins 
o f t ei I wou 1 d access 11 ie uni t s • ii i I 1 1 Iat f a s hi oi I when he f orgot his 
key. Tz .,
 w w*.. 1, at 13 8. There is nothing in the record to 
suggest Mr, Markham objected to this method of access by 
]> Ii I lawk: i is - - • -->m 
the manner of entry because Mr. Hawkins regularly accessed the 
units by rolling under the garage door with the knowledge and 
consent of Mr. Markham. 
Second, no inference of a culpable mental state can be 
drawn from the time of day Mr. Hawkins entered the units. 
According to Messrs. Markham and Severns, Mr. Hawkins frequently 
worked in the units in the early morning hours and, at times, 
would spend the entire night there. Tr., Vol. 1, at 138; Tr., 
Vol. 2, at 34. Mr. Markham was aware of this fact and did not 
object. Although working at four o'clock in the morning may not 
be common for most people, it was typical for Mr. Hawkins. 
Accordingly, no inference of criminal intent can be drawn from 
the time of day Mr. Hawkins entered the units. 
Finally, no inference of criminal intent can be drawn 
from Mr. Hawkins' actions after entry or his explanation 
concerning his presence on or near the property. Mr. Severns saw 
Mr. Hawkins shortly after 4:00 a.m. on the morning of the theft. 
Mr. Severns asked Mr. Hawkins what he was doing there. Tr., Vol. 
2, at 11. Mr. Hawkins responded he was looking for his dog. 
Mr. Hawkins' dog then ran around the corner and jumped into 
Mr. Hawkins' car. Mr. Hawkins then left the area. Id. 
There is also no logical connection between the criminal 
intent one must have upon entering the property and what occurred 
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from the fact that the accused presents himself to and speaks 
with a person who places him. .::^  .-JJ^ :.- _:iia_e.-y aicer the 
crime was committed. Indeed, speaking with Mi. Severns, rather 
than avoiding him, appears exculpatory rather than as evidence of 
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Mr. Severns' inquiry :s not suspicious. Mr, Hawkins said he was 
looking for his <.-^, -•:.^ ch he was. 
Even if Mr. Hawkins' later conduct in talking to Mr. 
Severns could somehow be construed as evidence of a prior 
c ....F- 11 iose fact:s i t n ist b e ; ? :i ewecil :i i I ] :ii g 1 It: c f 11 Ie 
totality of the :ircumstances. More specifically, what wrong-
doing, :i f any, was Mr Hawkins trying to cover up by talking with 
Mr. Severns? Assuming Mr. Hawkins committed a theft while inside 
the units, his subsequent conduct would have been to evade 
r e s p o i I s i b :i 3 :i 1:} f • : :i : 11 i s 1:1 l E f t: i I • :: t 1 1 i a t: I: i • a 1 i a ::i i 11 i 1 a ; ; f i 111 1 ;\, e n t: e r e d 
or remained. Therefore, the fact that I l:i : 1 lawkins was less 
candid witl I Mr: , Severns when asked what he was doing there was 
not indicative of a guilty mind with respect to a burglary. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence or. r.his 
C <J .-.-.. * : a -. . 
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parties, rather than evidence which is indicative of a culpable 
mental state. 
X. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests 
the Court to reverse the verdict of guilty of the burglary charge. 
XI. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Defendant requests oral argument because of the novelty of 
the issues presented under Utah law. 
DATED this 16th day of December, 1997. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Edward R. Montgomery 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Richard A. Van 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, DIVISION I, STATE 01 IITAII 
V. 
NI'AII n | HI , \ | | . 
Plaintiff, 
JOHN D. HAWKINS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
RULE 23 MOTION TO ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT 
Trial Court No. 961900499FS 
Judge: Wilkinson 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Rule 23 Motion To Arrest 
Judgment. Upon review ot Defendant's motion and the court record, the Court Finds: 
1. There was sufficient evidence presented to sustain the jury's verdict of guilt with 
respect to the burglary charge; and 
2. ThiW- v.vns mifficvr * < \ iiltMu e rvvsmft* f " ' • " ** (1 , r \ 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
The r lonorable Homer Wilkinson 
0*v J 
S7s 
Edward R. Montgomery 
Attorney for Defendant 
«&l Castk 
eputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
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I certify that on May 23, 1997,1 served copies of the above Order by placing copies of the 
^iinr in ihif I Imirrl Sf'iip*- M'liil postage prepaid rind i'ldressed ris lollow s: 
E. Neal Gunnarson, District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Cy H. Castle, Deputy District Attorney 
2001 S. State # F 3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210 
DATED Vr 
Edward XTMontgomery 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Edward R. Montgomery 
Utah Bar No. 7583 
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THE 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
^
r O F SATT T AKF, DTVTSTON T — 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JOHN D. HAWKINS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
Trial Court No. 961900499FS 
Judee: Wilkii ison 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion for a Directed 
WrJit I 11 i ing heard the evidence presented and listened to the argument by counsel, the Court. 
finds: 
1. The State presented sutiicient evidence to support a prima facie case of burglary; and 
2. The State presented sufficient evidence to support ;i pi ini.i farir f.F.e of fhrft. 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict. 
DATED M.- "' 1(-
The Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, DIVISION I, STATE OF UTAH 
V. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JOHN D. HAWKINS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
RULE 24 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Trial Court No. 961900499FS 
Judge: Wilkinson 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Rule 24 Motion for a New 
Trial. Upon review of Defendant's motion and the court record, the Court Finds: 
1. There was sufficient evidence presented to sustain the jury's verdict of guilt with 
respect to the burglary charge; and 
2. The jury was properly instructed with respect to the legal elements necessary to support 
a charge of burglary. 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Rule 24 Motion for a New Trial. 
DATED this ^ Day of May, 1997 
-7 pA 7 - ? ^ ^ ^ — 
/ The Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
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2001 S. State # F 3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210 
DATED Mav 23, 1997 
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